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There are costs associated with the administration of a civil justice system. How should those 
costs be met? That is an important question for all legal systems. In Scotland, it is one that 
successive Scottish Governments have answered by finding ways for those costs to be met by 
the users of the court system. Such a policy can broadly be referred to as “full cost recovery”. 
 
A recent consultation, which closed on 12 January 2018, sought views on the level of court 
fees in Scotland until 2021. It did so without stress-testing the overall policy of full cost 
recovery, but various consultees nevertheless took the opportunity to comment. Amongst the 
22 responses to this consultation was a response from the Access to Justice Committee of the 
Law Society of Scotland.1 Before going on to consider the individual points raised in the 
consultation, that Committee – which both authors of this article are members of – reiterated 
its resistance to any moves towards full cost recovery (having also made the point in 2016). 
The Committee noted: “A properly funded court system is an essential part of our civilised 
society and respect for the rule of law, and it is in the public interest to maintain a robust and 
respected system for resolving disputes. It is the proper responsibility of the state to fund that 
system.” 
 
With the consultation now closed, the Scottish Government response to that exercise available, 
and the court fees in subsequent Orders expected to run until 31 March 2021, it might be 
thought that it is rather late to analyse all of this, but whilst one consultation exercise has closed 
another will come around soon enough: some point in 2020 being the expected moment.2 This 
analysis should also be of interest to non-Scottish readers who may be contending with a similar 
challenge in another jurisdiction. 
 
With that in mind, this article aims to inform any future Scottish consultation exercise, by 
critiquing full cost recovery in principle and by offering potential routes by which its 
implementation might be challenged. It will begin by explaining what full cost recovery 
actually is and investigating its origins, before interrogating some of the assumptions or 
acquiescence that seems to have developed around the issue and discussing the potential for 
litigation against court fees in Scotland. 
 
                                                 
1 Available at https://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/359439/atj-consultation-on-scottish-court-fees-2018-2021.pdf . 
The Faculty of Advocates also opposed the increase: see R Jackson, The Scotsman 10 January 2018 “Lawyers 
warn Scotland’s court fees scheme ‘could be illegal’” at https://www.scotsman.com/news/lawyers-warn-
scotland-s-court-fees-scheme-could-be-illegal-1-4657955. 
2 Scottish Court Fees 2018-2021: consultation analysis and Scottish Government response (2018) para 81, 
available at https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-court-fees-2018-2021-analysis-consultation-scottish-
government-response/pages/0/. 
B. COURT FEES, AND THE ORIGINS OF FULL COST RECOVERY 
 
A critical question for those interested in civil justice is not ‘what rights do we give?’, 
but having given those rights… what opportunities and structures do we provide for the 
public to enforce those rights and obligations or make good their entitlements?3 
 
Undergirding much of the discussion in this paper is the notion of access to justice. It will be 
analysed in more detail below. It is important to state at the outset though that the meeting of 
costs involved in bringing legal proceedings – which forms an inevitable part of a transition to 
full cost recovery – is part of the access to justice mix. In simple terms, any increase in costs 
for a potential litigant will have an impact on those users who struggle to afford whatever those 
costs might be; much like the economic concept of price elasticity, stretching a fee to a higher 
level will (eventually) have an impact on how many people are able or willing to pay that fee. 
 
For context, here is a snapshot of fee levels as at 1 April 2019 working through the court 
hierarchy. In the Sheriff Court, the default for raising proceedings is £129 unless another sum 
is specified, with a summary cause/simple procedure costing £104 to raise (or, for an action 
worth less than £300, only £19) and other particular procedures having set fees, and thereafter 
the defender may have to pay to respond (the corresponding default sum being £129) and then 
further costs may accrue depending on how the case develops.4 For each day or part thereof of 
proof, debate or hearing in a summary or miscellaneous application on the merits of the cause 
there is a fee of £232. In the Sheriff Appeal Court, daily hearing fees for a bench of one are 
£237 (and £593 for a bench of three).5 A Court of Session hearing (during the normal working 
day) before a bench of one or two judges is £209 payable by each party for every 30 minutes 
or part thereof (albeit the first 30 minutes of the hearing of a motion is free).6 Fees in all three 
courts will increase again on 1 April 2020. 
 
Granted, there are some things that need to be considered alongside court fees. First, the general 
“expenses follow success”7 principle might be seen as a means of meritorious cases not getting 
sifted at an early stage. As was noted by a respondent quoted in the Taylor Review,8 however, 
such an analysis is a tad simplistic, as there can be a disparity between actual expenses incurred 
and the level of recovery, not to mention the fact that an expenses award might come much 
later than an initial outlay. Even with innovations that might allow some flavours of litigation 
to proceed, such as qualified one-way cost shifting for personal injury cases,9 many cases can 
still be discouraged by high fees. 
 
Legal aid – another important feature in the access to justice mix which will be analysed in 
more detail below – offers a safety net for some, but there is an increasingly squeezed middle 
of those who are ineligible for support but unable to afford the costs associated with litigation, 
leaving a corresponding void in cases that are brought.10 And whilst the expense of court might 
                                                 
3 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2010) 11. 
4 The Sheriff Court Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/81), as amended by the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment Order 
2018 (SSI 2018/194). 
5 The Sheriff Appeal Court Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/82). 
6 The Court of Session etc. Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/83). 
7 Consider Ashiq v Secretary of State for Home Dept [2016] CSIH 1 as a recent example of its application. 
8 Sheriff J A Taylor, Report of the Review of Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation in Scotland (2013) ch 2, 
para 6, at https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/0043/00438205.pdf. 
9 Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act s 8. 
10 Consider C McCorkindale, “The New Powers of the Judiciary in Scotland – Part I” Judicial Power Project 
(2016) where he notes “challenges are typically raised by those with the greatest resources (e.g. insurance, 
encourage or indeed force some people towards alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
even a recent Scottish Parliament Committee Report entitled I won't see you in court: 
alternative dispute resolution in Scotland noted that “in some cases going to court may be the 
most appropriate form of dispute resolution and parties should remain free to choose that option 
if they so wish.”11 The “free” in that quote is presumably to be construed as “available”. As we 
shall see, choosing – if that is the correct word – the “option” of court is not free for many.  
 
This paper will not bring fresh empirical analysis into the impact that fees or indeed other 
litigation-related outlays and non-financial hurdles may have on people who find themselves 
facing a legal problem.12 It will however bring some analysis of what hampering access to 
court might mean when it comes to establishing useful precedent (albeit that might be taken as 
something of a given in the aftermath of the important UK Supreme Court decision of R (on 
the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor),13 and, most importantly, it will target and test 
some of the assumptions about fees and the justifications for full cost recovery that have been 
made. Before doing so, we explain how Scotland has reached the current position. 
 
(1) Powers to set court fees 
 
From the late 19th century until the early 1980s, fees in the Court of Session and Sheriff Court 
were set using powers in the Courts of Law (Fees) (Scotland) Act 1895 and the Sheriff Courts 
(Scotland) Act 1907 respectively. The powers to set court fees in both Acts was exercised by 
the Court of Session, acting with the approval of the Commissioners of Her Majesty’s 
Treasury.14 
 
This changed with the introduction of the Divorce Jurisdiction, Court Fees and Legal Aid 
(Scotland) Act 1983. This transferred the power to set court fees to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland,15 reassigning the power to set court fees from the Judiciary to the Executive. 
 
The power to set fees was then transferred to the Scottish Ministers under the Scotland Act 
1998.16 Following this, the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 clarified that the power to set 
court fees is the exclusive domain of the Scottish Ministers.17 Under the 2014 Act, the Scottish 
Ministers have the power to make provision for the charging of fees in respect of the carrying 
out of the functions of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service by way of order. 
                                                 
alcohol and tobacco companies, wealthy landowners or well-funded interest groups) or by those with the least 
(for example, by prisoners who are able to access legal aid)”, at https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/the-new-
powers-of-the-judiciary-in-scotland/, linking there to five cases brought by those with the greatest resources and 
one brought by prisoners with nothing to lose. This is discussed further below. 
11 Justice Committee, SP Paper 381 9th Report, 2018 (Session 5) para 122. See also T Bingham, The Rule of 
Law (2011) 86. On the Justice Committee Report, see further B Clark, “Some reflections on ‘I won’t see you in 
court’” 2019 Jur. Rev. 182. Incidentally, immediately prior to the extracted quote it was noted that the 
Committee agreed with the majority of the evidence before it that people should not be compelled to participate 
in alternative dispute resolution. Without wishing to oversimplify, if someone is not to be compelled towards 
ADR but court is too expensive, what is someone with a genuine dispute supposed to do? 
12 See H Genn and A Paterson, Paths to Justice Scotland: What people in Scotland do and think about going to 
law (2001). 
13 [2017] UKSC 51, para 69-73. See further E Rose, “R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor: A 
masterclass in the constitutional right of access to the courts” 2017 Jur. Rev. 261. 
14 Courts of Law (Fees) (Scotland) Act 1895 s 2 and Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 s 40. 
15 Divorce Jurisdiction, Court Fees and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1983 s 4 – which amended s 2 of the Courts of 
Law (Fees) (Scotland) Act 1895. 
16 S 53. 
17 S 107. 
 
In respect of civil cases which reach the UK Supreme Court from Scotland, the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 provides that the Lord Chancellor can prescribe fees by order.18 This power 
is to be exercised after consultation with the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Faculty 
of Advocates and the Law Society of Scotland (amongst other bodies from elsewhere in the 
UK).19 When exercising this power, the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that 
access to the courts must not be denied.20 
 
(2) Court fees pre-devolution 
 
Full cost recovery (FCR) – the policy that the costs of the civil justice system should be funded 
directly by its litigants, rather than it being paid out of general taxation – pre-dates devolved 
government in Scotland. Prior to devolution, the UK Government’s policy had been to increase 
civil court fees up to the point of FCR.21 
 
Stephenson has remarked that the legislative history of court fees in Scotland was largely static 
from the early 20th century until the 1980s.22 The Civil Justice Council has noted that the 
development of FCR is a relatively recent one – and prior to the 1980s, two UK Government 
papers had addressed the issue in detail.23 First, in a 1923 report on court fees, a committee 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor found that: 
 
We understand that in the opinion of the Treasury the balance between expenditure and 
revenue of the County Courts should be adjusted on the basis that the State should bear 
the cost of the Court buildings and the salaries, pensions, and travelling expenses of 
the Judges, and that the rest of the expenditure should be defrayed by the suitors' fees.24 
 
The issue of fees appears not to have surfaced again until the 1980s. The Twelfth Report for 
the Committee of Public Accounts for the 1981-1982 session noted that the Treasury’s view 
on the matter had changed, that the policy was under review and some form of cost recovery 
would be sought.25 
 
Then – in the Government’s Expenditure Plans 1983-84 to 1985-86 – it was stated that, "for 
the Civil Courts, the plans take account of the agreed policy to recover full costs less judicial 
costs through court fees".26 In the assessment of the Civil Justice Council, this meant that, 
“apparently without any formal announcement or debate in Parliament, it had been decided that 
accommodation costs should be borne by litigants”.27 
 
                                                 
18 S 52. 
19 S 52(4-6). 
20 S 52(3). 
21 Scottish Executive, Civil court fees in the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court: a consultation paper (2001), 
para 1. 
22 Andrew Stephenson, “Court fees: an increased risk for practitioners” Civil Practice Bulletin (2017). 
23 Civil Justice Council, “Full costs recovery: a paper by the fees sub-committee” (2002) 4-6. 
24 Report of the Committee to Consider court fees (1923, Cmd. 1856), para 6 – quoted in Civil Justice Council, 
“Full costs recovery” 4. 
25 Civil Justice Council “Full costs recovery” 4-5. 
26 The UK Government’s Expenditure Plans 1983-84 to 1985-86 (Vol II) 42 – quoted in Civil Justice Council, 
‘Full costs recovery’ 5. 
27 Para 2.6. 
Almost immediately prior to devolution, further developments confirmed the UK 
Government’s intention to pursue FCR. The Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine reaffirmed the 
Government’s commitment to FCR in a debate on civil court fees in the House of Lords in July 
1997.28 A September 1997 report by on civil justice and legal aid found that: 
 
One of the most important signals in any system is price. If prices do not fully reflect 
costs, it is not possible for users to make sound choices about the appropriate way to 
pursue their problem…There is no justification for setting fees generally at levels that 
do not reflect cost.29 
 
A 1998 discussion paper then issued by the UK Department for Constitutional Affairs then 
proposed further amendments to FCR, including that fees be charged in advance rather than in 
arrears.30 
 
(3) Court fees post-devolution 
 
The power to set fees was transferred to the Scottish Ministers by the Scotland Act 1998. Post-
devolution, an alternative approach could have been adopted. Yet devolution saw the 
continuation and entrenchment of FCR in Scotland. 
 
On carrying out the first post-devolution review of the policy of FCR, the then 2001 Scottish 
Executive consultation paper noted that: 
 
Scottish Ministers have reviewed the policy that was inherited from their predecessors. 
Their view is that there should continue to be a move in the direction of full cost 
recovery.31 
 
Scottish Governments of various political compositions have since demonstrated their 
commitment to FCR. The post-devolution history of court fees is one of a stream of 
consultation documents and statutory instruments which have gradually increased court fees 
towards a position of FCR. 
 
                                                 
28 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, reaffirmed that "the present principle is to recover the full cost of providing 
the civil courts, less an amount equivalent to the sum of exemptions and remissions", 14 July 1997 (Hansard, col 
863ff). 
29 Peter Middleton, Report to the Lord Chancellor (UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, 1997), paras 5.21 
and 5.22. 
30 UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, Access to Justice - Civil Fees: A Lord Chancellor’s Department 
Discussion Paper (1998). 
31 Scottish Executive, Civil court fees in the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court: a consultation paper (2001), 
para 2. 
Eight rounds of court fee amendments have occurred post-devolution. Successive fee increases 
have been made by Scottish statutory instruments in 2002,32 2007,33 2008,34 2009,35 2012,36 
2015,37 201638 and 2018.39 
 
To understand the effect of the policy of FCR in Scotland, it is helpful to examine the changes 
that these orders have made to the fees charged to litigants. In the 1999 (pre-devolution) fee 
order, the fee payable in the Court of Session per half hour of hearing time was £13 for a single 
judge hearing in the Outer House and £26 per half hour in the Inner House.40 The equivalent 
fees are now £209 and £522 per half hour respectively.41 In the Sheriff Court, the fee payable 
per each day (or part thereof) of a proof, debate or hearing in a summary or miscellaneous 
application on the merits of the cause in the 1999 fee order was £58.42 The equivalent fee is 
now £237.43 
 
(4) FCR policy themes post-devolution 
 
Scottish Governments’ policies on court fees (as evidenced by the consultation documents 
which preceded each round of statutory instruments) have displayed three common themes. 
 
First, the preference for FCR is framed around the need to remove the “subsidy” which the 
general taxpayer has provided to resolving civil disputes.44 This view is predicated on the 
understanding that the civil courts provide a private dispute resolution service – the benefits of 
which are accrued by the parties directly involved in civil litigation. This is clearly articulated 
in the 2015 consultation paper, which justifies FCR in the following terms: 
 
Where a dispute is between two private individuals, the policy position taken by the 
Government is that the majority of the benefits of resolving that dispute are expected to 
flow to the parties rather than to the state. Therefore, it is unreasonable to ask taxpayers 
                                                 
32 The Court of Session Fees Amendment Order 2002 (SSI 2002/270) and the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment 
Order 2002 (SSI 2002/269). 
33 The Sheriff Court Fees Amendment Order 2007 (SSI 2007/318) and the Court of Session etc. Fees Amendment 
Order 2007 (SSI 2007/319). 
34 The Court of Session etc. Fees Amendment Order 2008 (SSI 2008/236), the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment 
Order 2008 (SSI 2008/237) and the Lyon Court and Office Fees (Variation) (No. 2) Order 2008 (SSI 2008/168). 
35 The Court of Session etc. Fees Amendment Order 2009 (SSI 2009/88) and the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment 
Order 2009 (SSI 2009/89). 
36 The Court of Session etc. Fees Amendment Order 2012 (SSI 2012/290) and the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment 
Order 2012 (SSI 2012/293). 
37 The Adults with Incapacity (Public Guardian’s Fees) (Scotland) Regulations 2015 (SSI 2015/260), the Court of 
Session etc. Fees Order 2015 (SSI 2015/261), the Sheriff Court Fees Order 2015 (SSI 2015/264) and the Sheriff 
Appeal Court Fees Order 2015 (SSI 2015/379). 
38 The Court Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) (Scotland) Order 2016 (SSI 2016/332) and the Lyon Court and 
Office Fees (Variation) (Devolved Functions) Order 2016 (SSI 2016/390). 
39 The Sheriff Court Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/81), the Sheriff Appeal Court Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/82), 
the Court of Session etc. Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/83) and the Sheriff Court Fees Amendment Order 2018 (SSI 
2018/194). 
40 The Court of Session etc. Fees Amendment Order 1999 (SI 1999/755), Schedule 2, Part I, B19 and B20. 
41 SSI 2018/83, Schedule 1, Part I, B16 and B17. 
42 The Sheriff Court Fees Amendment Order 1999, (SI 1999/754), Schedule, Part II, para 25. 
43 The Sheriff Court Fees Order 2018 (SSI 2018/81), Schedule 2, Part 1, para 27. 
44 Scottish Executive, Civil court fees in the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court: a consultation paper (2001), 
para 1 and the Scottish Court Service, Consultation paper on review of fees charged by the Court of Session, 
Sheriff Courts, Office of the Public Guardian, Accountant of Court and High Court (2008), para 1.1. 
to pay for this. Consequently, fees are charged rather than the costs being funded from 
general taxation…45 
 
The second theme is a repeated commitment to ensuring that access to justice is maintained for 
those who cannot afford to go to court.46 The tension between FCR and maintaining access to 
justice is managed (at least in the view of successive Scottish Governments) by a fee exemption 
regime. Under this regime, those in receipt of either civil legal aid or certain means tested 
benefits are not required to pay court fees. 
 
Third, the effects of FCR on access to justice for those ineligible for the fee exemption regime 
(i.e. people whose circumstances place them above the thresholds for civil legal aid or means 
tested benefits) are portrayed as minimal. Scottish Governments have repeatedly asserted that 
court fees make up a small proportion of the overall costs of civil litigation.47 The assumption 
behind this repetition appears to be that because court fees constitute a low proportion of overall 
costs, they cannot be prohibitive of themselves. 
 
To evidence this assertion, particular reliance is made on a 2007 study commissioned by the 
Ministry of Justice which purports to show that the cost of court fees plays a minor role in the 
decision to go to court.48 This research was also referred to approvingly in the Report of the 
Scottish Civil Courts Review in 2009 (the “Gill Review”).49 We critique the 2007 study below. 
 
In passing, it can be noted that FCR is not solely a matter for the court system, and many public 
services are facing a similar push towards FCR. For example, a recent consultation regarding 
fees connected with bankruptcy proceedings was preloaded with the declaration “All 
government Bodies are asked to work to the general principle of full cost recovery, where the 
users and those who benefit from the service the Agency provides meet the costs associated 
with those services.”50 That being the case, when it came to responding to that consultation 
exercise the Accountant in Bankruptcy noted that “Bankruptcy numbers, and income from fees, 
will… be very dependent on the economic cycle – so that seeking full cost recovery for each 
and every individual year would mean regular and significant changes in fee levels” and further 
noting that “It is accepted that the aspiration to achieve full cost recovery is just that – a 
                                                 
45 Scottish Government, Fees charged by the Court of Session, Accountant of Court, Sheriff & Justice of the Peace 
Courts, High Court, Office of the Public Guardian, personal injury court and the Sheriff Appeal Court: 
Consultation Paper (2015), para 12. 
46 Scottish Executive, 2001 consultation, para 2 and Scottish Court Service, 2008 consultation, para 2.2. 
47 Scottish Court Service, 2008 consultation, para 2.2.5; Scottish Government, 2015 consultation, para 13; Scottish 
Government, Consultation on Scottish Court Fees (2016) 7; Scottish Government, Equality Impact Assessment 
Record: Consultation on Scottish Court Fees 2018-2021 (Court of Session, High Court of Justiciary, Sheriff 
Appeal Court, Sheriff Courts including Sheriff Personal Injury Court, Justice of the Peace Courts and Office of 
the Public Guardian) (2018) 6. 
48 Scottish Court Service, 2008 consultation para 2.2.5 and Scottish Government, 2015 consultation para 13. 
49 Brian Gill, Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review – Volume 2 (2009), ch 14, para 165, available at 
https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/civil-courts-reform/report-of-the-scottish-civil-courts-
review-vol-2-chapt-10---15.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
50 See https://www.aib.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2017_fees_consultation_final.pdf. Thanks to Donna McKenzie 
Skene for drawing this to our attention. Consider also the costs of land registration and the Final Business and 
Regulatory Impact Assessment to The Fees in the Registers of Scotland Amendment Order 2010, which noted 
Registers of Scotland’s obligation to recover the full operating costs of its services (para 2), at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2010/404/pdfs/ssien_20100404_en.pdf. 
principle with limits in practice”.51 That sets something of a general critique of FCR. A court-
specific critique now follows. 
 
C. CRITIQUING FULL COST RECOVERY 
 
FCR can be criticised for a number of reasons. Chief amongst these is its effect on the ability 
of individuals to afford access to the civil justice system. Further, FCR’s rationale is based on 
several questionable propositions. 
 
(1) Effect of FCR on access to justice 
 
The House of Commons Justice Committee has warned that the introduction of FCR requires 
“particular care and strong justification”52 due to its potential impacts on access to justice. In 
its analysis, the introduction of fees to UK Employment Tribunals had a “significant adverse 
impact on access to justice for meritorious claims”.53 
 
Access to justice has been alluded to already, but it now falls to be analysed in the context of 
FCR specifically. It is not the place of this article to seek to define access to justice,54 but it 
might be useful to set out what it means in broad terms. As a general starting point, Cornford 
suggests the paradigm of access to justice “entails a right of equal access to legal assistance for 
every citizen”.55 When it comes to access to justice in Scotland, the story invariably starts in 
the fifteenth century with the Poor’s Roll,56 which the late Lord Bingham described as “the 
world’s first statutory authority on legal aid for the poor”.57 Recent analysis by Findlay has 
shed useful light on the legal profession’s history of pro bono work in applying this system,58 
and further legal aid provision can be tracked from the introduction of the welfare state in the 
aftermath of World War II.59 But providing and supporting access to representation is not quite 
                                                 
51 https://www.aib.gov.uk/sites/default/files/aib_-_policy_development_-_fees_regulations_2018_-
_consultation_response_-_april_2018_2.pdf (8). 
52 House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and tribunals fees (HC 167) (UK Parliament, 2016), para 46. 
53 Ibid, para 69. 
54 See generally D B Walters, “Legal aid, access to justice and the rule of law” in D L Carey Miller and D W 
Meyers (eds) Comparative and historical essays in Scots law: a tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC 
(1992) 117; Genn and Paterson, Paths to Justice Scotland; A Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good: 
Democracy in Action? The Hamlyn Lectures, 62nd Series (2011); and E Palmer, T Cornford, A Guinchard and 
Y Marique (eds), Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity (2016). In passing, it can be 
noted that there is an Access to Justice Act 1999, but that fails to provide an authoritative definition. 
55 A Cornford, “The Meaning of Access to Justice”, in Palmer et al (eds), Access to Justice 27 at 39. Cf 
Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good, 60. 
56 This provides, “gif there bee onie pure creature that… can nocht, nor may nocht follow his cause the King, for 
the lufe of god sall ordane that Juge befor quham the cause suld be determyt purvey and get a lele and a wyse 
advocate to follow sic pur creaturis cause. And gif sic cause be obteynt the wranger sall assyth bath the party 
scathit and the advocatis costis and travale.” Ordinance of the Parliament of Perth passed on 12 March 1424, 
APS II, 1424, p8 (c. 24), quoted in Walters, “Legal aid, access to justice and the rule of law” 152. 
57 Bingham, The Rule of Law 87. 
58 J Findlay, Legal Practice in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (2015) ch 6. See also some contemporary analysis 
in also some contemporary discussion about this in Bell’s Dictionary (1838) 749, and in W Dunlop Treatise on 
the Law of Scotland Relative to the Poor 2nd edn (1828). Thanks to Adelyn Wilson for drawing these to our 
attention. 
59 Through the Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1949. As a result of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, 
the Scottish Legal Aid Board came into being in 1987. Relevant history is explained on the Board’s website, 
accessible at https://www.slab.org.uk/about-us/who-we-are/history/. 
the same thing as setting court fees that price people out of the system.60 Requiring court users 
to directly pay the costs of civil justice has the potential to make the courts inaccessible to 
certain individuals. Court fees may have an indirect discriminatory effect on groups with below 
average incomes and personal wealth. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has raised 
concerns that disabled people, ethnic minorities and women may be disproportionately affected 
by the rises in court fees.61 
 
The fee exemption regime goes some way to mitigating these reservations. However, there are 
concerns surrounding the creation of a ‘middle income trap’.62 This refers to the situation where 
those on low incomes retain access to justice through an exemption from court fees, and high 
earners can afford raised fees. Those on middle incomes are said to be ‘trapped’ between the 
two – ineligible for exemptions yet unable to afford the new fees. The Faculty of Advocates 
has noted the “very low” thresholds for fee exemptions, which leaves a “very substantial 
proportion of Scots” ineligible.63 
 
As stated, the Scottish Government has relied on a 2007 Ministry of Justice-commissioned 
study64 for the proposition that cost of court fees is a minor factor for individuals considering 
to go to court. The study – titled ‘What’s cost got to do with it?’ – sought to examine the effect 
that court fees had on court users accessing the courts. It used several methods including a 
literature review, group discussions with court users who had paid their own fees and personal 
injury representatives and telephone surveys with court users who had paid their own fees. 
 
In terms of the Scottish Government’s reliance on the study as evidence of the non-significance 
of court fees, two features of the research bring this belief into question. 
 
First, the study provides evidence that court fees can affect the decision to go to court (albeit 
for a minority of the court users involved in the study). During the study, individuals were 
asked whether their decision to proceed to court would have been affected if court fees had 
been higher. 69% said that it would not make a difference; 18% said that it would have made 
a difference, 10% said that it was dependent on the amount of the increase and 3% felt unable 
to answer the question.65 
 
The study also asked individuals to rate the impact that incremental court fee increases would 
have on their decision to progress to court. Participants were asked what impact having court 
fees increase by set amounts would have on their decision to go to court. The fee increases 
tested were £10, £50, £100, £150, £200 and £300. The study found that: 
 
Overall, the number of individuals who would definitely progress a claim to court 
decreases by roughly 10% with each cost increment up to an increase of £100 in total… 
So, if price were to increase by £10, £50 and £100, those likely to definitely go to court 
would decrease by 10% for each of the 3 price increases.66 
                                                 
60 Consider S Peers, “Europe to the Rescue? EU Law, the ECHR and Legal Aid”, where he notes legal aid in EU 
countries [then including the UK] “takes two forms: support for the costs of a lawyer, and exemption from court 
fees”, in Palmer et al (eds) Access to Justice 53 at 53. 
61 Equality and Human Rights Commission Consultation Response (2016) 7. 
62 Citizens Advice Scotland 2016 Court Fees Consultation Response (2016) 6. 
63 Faculty of Advocates Consultation Response (2016) 12. 
64 UK Ministry of Justice, What’s cost got to do with it? The impact of changing court fees on users (UK MOJ, 
2007). 
65 Ibid, 49. 
66 Ibid, 52. 
 
At the maximum price increase of £300, it found that only 6 in 10 participants would still 
definitely go to court.67 The study therefore suggests a significant minority of court users could 
be deterred from accessing the court by fee increases. 
 
Second, the methodology of the research means that the study cannot be relied upon for the 
proposition that cost is a small factor for individuals considering to go to court. The research 
surveyed court users who had started either family or civil court proceedings in the period 
August 2005 to July 2006 at a court in England and Wales and paid their own fees. 
 
The study surveyed the views of those whose cases were already in court, and who had already 
paid fees to access civil justice – it did not survey those who were considering to go to court. 
This is an important distinction. There may be many individuals who had already been deterred 
from going to court by the court fees which existed at the time of the study.68 Given this 
selection of participants, it is open to question whether the study provides any useful findings 
in relation to the effect of court fees on those considering going to court. 
 
Overall then, the extent to which court fees in Scotland deter individuals considering to access 
civil justice is unknown. The study provides evidence that – even of those who are able to pay 
court fees – increasing court fees would have a detrimental effect on a significant minority. 
There is sufficient evidence to question the Scottish Government’s position that such effects 
are minimal. 
 
(2) The rationale for FCR 
 
The view of the Scottish Government is that the civil courts provide a private dispute resolution 
service whose benefits largely accrue to the parties involved. FCR is justified as removing a 
subsidy. Underpinning this rationale are two notions: that access to civil justice is an optional 
commodity and that the majority of the benefits of civil litigation go to the parties involved. 
These shall be critiqued in turn. 
 
(i) Access to civil justice as an optional commodity 
 
Wilmot-Smith has argued that passing the costs of the civil justice system to its immediate 
users transforms it from a ‘public service’, to ‘a service, available for public use’.69 Under 
FCR, an individual who raises court proceedings ‘purchases’ their entitlement to a judgement 
from the court through the payment of a court fee70 – and the courts are only accessible to those 
who are able to pay court fees (unless eligible for an exemption). 
 
Access to civil justice effectively becomes a commodity or a consumer purchase option which 
can be acquired, rather than a universal entitlement to be enjoyed equally by all. The notion 
that justice can be bought and sold conflicts with the concept of justice itself, which requires 
that both sides and their arguments are heard, independently of their ability to pay.71 
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In a society where rights are set out in law, it is difficult to imagine how rights could be 
effectively realised without recourse to judicial enforcement. Without access to the courts, 
rights can be neglected – leaving those with wealth and political power free to exploit the poor 
and the weak.72 If it is accepted that legal rights which an individual is unable to enforce 
through the courts are of little worth, access to civil justice can only be regarded as optional if 
the same attitude is taken towards realising legal rights. Access to civil justice is a precondition 
to the enjoyment of legal rights. 
 
Access to civil justice is better understood as a human right. This view is supported by a range 
of international human rights agreements which recognise the right of access to justice in 
various forms, and in relation to numerous topics.73 Civil justice is a constitutional fundamental 
and a social necessity; it is not a product which an informed consumer can choose at will. FCR 
is an inappropriate market solution that commoditises access to a public service which has 
important social functions. 
 
(ii) The civil justice system is a private dispute resolution service 
 
An initial point relates to any characterisation of any public service as leading to private 
benefits. Part of the rationale for providing health care and education which is free at the point 
of use, for example, is that – despite individuals gaining discrete personal assistance as a result 
– such services also provide collective social benefits. Similarly, the civil justice system 
provides a combination of individual and public benefits. There are broad benefits from having 
a literate, educated and healthy populace – and it can also be contended that collective benefits 
accrue from individuals having access to an effective and respected way of resolving disputes.74 
 
It is true that litigation can create excludable private benefits for the parties involved, such as 
an award of damages for personal injury.75 However, it is a misconception that only the 
immediate parties to litigation gain any benefits. The idea that the civil justice system is a 
private dispute resolution service for solving problems between individuals, with little wider 
social benefit, is demonstrably fictitious. 
 
Society draws a number of benefits from civil justice. Litigation allows for enforcement of the 
rights and rules which are key to a healthy and just society such as human rights, employment 
laws and environmental regulation. The public vindication of such legal rights plays a critical 
role in ensuring that these legal frameworks have life outside the legislature. Litigation clarifies 
and decides the law for the community,76 helps to maintain social order by resolving disputes 
peacefully77 and can play a role in preventing harm.78 
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Litigation provides useful training for the lawyers and judges involved and can result in the 
disclosure of facts which are important for public health, government integrity and “the general 
support of peace and order”.79 The belief that claims of injustice will be taken seriously and 
addressed by an impartial adjudicator is said to lessen alienation and strengthen community 
cohesion,80 and the courts reinforce dominant social and economic values.81 
 
Hazel Genn has explained that the famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson82 demonstrates the 
public benefits of civil litigation: 
 
The case effectively transformed the law. Whatever view is taken of the decision, the 
case established protection for consumers, created an incentive for those who create 
risks to take care and the possibility of redress for those harmed by negligent actions. 
In this way the common law has developed on the back of private and business disputes 
and thousands of cases have been settled in its wake.83 
 
It is important to remember that civil courts do not adjudicate solely in disputes between private 
individuals. They have important constitutional functions also.84 In exercising their public law 
jurisdiction, the civil courts are critical to maintaining the rule of law. 
 
On most understandings of the rule of law, the Executive should act within its legal powers. 
To ensure this, the state must provide its citizens access to the courts to police the legality of 
executive acts through the supervisory jurisdiction of judicial review. By forcing the state to 
release information and provide remedies, civil litigation can constitute a “democracy-
enhancing practice”.85 This restricts the arbitrary, self-interested use of public power and 
promotes good government. Recent cases such as Miller86 and UNISON produced decisions on 
critical constitutional issues which clarified the law and provided socially valuable precedents; 
appropriately enough, UNISON also clarified the public benefits that flow from the 
enforcement of rights conferred by Parliament,87 a point returned to below. 
 
 
D. CHALLENGING FULL COST RECOVERY 
 
The previous section critiqued FCR in theory. We now consider ways in which an inaccessible 
justice system could be challenged in practice through the courts, primarily through human 
rights but also considering Scots common law.88 
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(1) ECHR Article 6(1) 
 
(a) Jurisprudence on the right to a court under Article 6(1) 
 
Scottish legislation – including secondary legislation on court fees - must comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).89 Article 6 of the ECHR protects the right to 
a fair hearing, and Article 6(1)90 of the ECHR has been interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) as providing for a ‘right to a court’ to assert civil rights.91 
 
The ECtHR has found that the right of access to a court must be practical and effective.92 
However, the right is not absolute and limitations may be imposed by a State. In the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, this is justified because the right of access “by its very nature calls for regulation 
by the State”93 – and Article 6(1) leaves a contracting state a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the 
means to be used in ensuring this right.  
 
Although states can limit the right, the ECtHR requires that any limitations which are imposed 
must not impair the essence of the right.94 Additionally, a limitation will not be Article 6(1) 
compatible unless it pursues a ‘legitimate aim’ and there is a ‘reasonable relationship of 
proportionality’ to the aim sought.95 
 
The ECtHR has considered the consistency of court fees with the Article 6 right to a fair hearing 
in several cases. It has declared court fees to violate the Article 6(1) right of access to a court 
in a number of decisions.96 Overall, the ECtHR is not particularly stringent in its supervision 
of court fees.97 It gives a margin of appreciation to States, and when considering breaches it 
applies an individualised assessment as to whether fees are compliant, examining the 
applicant’s ability to pay.98 
 
The jurisprudence on this issue does not allow for an exact demarcation between fees which 
would be permissible and those which would violate Article 6(1). Instead, the cases 
demonstrate that at least five factors are considered by the ECtHR as indicative of a violation. 
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The first (and clearest) factor is that a person has been unable to pursue their civil claim due to 
being unable to pay the court fees.99 In Kreuz v Poland the fact that a court fee was equivalent 
to the national annual salary at the time of the litigation was indicative that it was not affordable 
for the applicant.100 
 
It is not necessary for the fees to have prevented a person from pursuing his/her claim. In 
Stankov v Bulgaria, fees imposed after the conclusion of litigation were deemed capable of 
violating Article 6(1), because the fees amounted to 90% of the compensation which had been 
awarded to the applicant in a claim against the state for wrongful detention.101 
 
Second, the conduct of the relevant judicial authorities can be relevant. For example, a refusal 
by national judicial authorities to accept an applicant’s claim to be unable to pay his/her court 
fees,102 a failure by the judicial authorities to accurately assess an applicant’s financial 
situation,103 an assessment by the judicial authorities that an applicant with limited means is 
able to pay a court fee, the payment of which would have a detrimental effect on the applicant’s 
ability to “build her future and secure her and her minor children’s basic needs”104 after a 
divorce and a failure by the judicial authorities to allow an applicant to pay either a reduced 
court fee105 or pay a fee in instalments106 have all been deemed as supportive of an Article 6(1) 
violation. 
 
The way in which fees are administered is the third factor. Fees imposed at the outset of 
proceedings have been deemed by the ECtHR to have a more significant effect, because they 
can prevent a claim from being heard by a national court.107 However, (as mentioned) Stankov 
v Bulgaria showed that fees imposed after the conclusion of litigation are also capable of 
violating Article 6(1). 
 
Fourth, the aim of the system of court fees is relevant. The ECtHR has repeated that restrictions 
which are of a purely financial nature and unrelated to the merits of an appeal or its prospects 
of success, “should be subject to a particularly rigorous scrutiny”.108 
 
In Reuther v Germany,109 an unsuccessful claim of an Article 6(1) violation, the applicant’s 
claim in the German courts was deemed to have little merit. The applicant in Reuther had been 
deterred from accessing court by a fee. The ECtHR held that it had never ruled out the 
possibility that the interests of the “fair administration of justice”110 (i.e. deterring 
unmeritorious claims) may justify the imposition of a financial limitations on the right to a 
court. 
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In this vein, in Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland the ECtHR found that because the aim 
of a court fee was the State’s interest in deriving income from fees rather than protecting the 
other party from irrecoverable legal costs or protecting the system of justice against an 
unmeritorious appeal by the applicant – this was a factor indicative of a violation of Article 
6(1).111 
 
Finally, the ECtHR has examined the nature of the claim and the applicant’s conduct 
throughout the claim. Having a claim which is not frivolous or unmeritorious counts in an 
applicant’s favour,112 and the court requires “particular diligence”113 by national authorities in 
cases which concern an applicant’s civil status. In Zubac v Croatia the fact that an applicant 
incurred higher court fees as a result of her conduct during the case counted against her claim 
of an Article 6(1) violation.114 
 
(b) Raising an Article 6(1) claim in Scotland 
 
Article 6 issues have been frequently raised in the Scottish Courts, and its use has led to high 
profile changes to Scots law such as the introduction of a statutory right of access to legal 
advice for suspects being questioned by the police following the UK Supreme Court’s decision 
in Cadder.115 However, the right to a court has been raised infrequently in the Scottish Courts, 
and only one successful challenge has been made on this basis. 
 
In Kelly v Gilmartin’s Executrix116 the Court of Session was not persuaded by the argument 
that the right to a court should lead to an interpretation of the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 that would extend the period of negative prescription for a personal injury 
claim. Apollo Engineering Limited v James Scott Ltd saw an Extra Division of the Court find 
that a rule which required a company to be represented in court only by an advocate or a 
solicitor with a right of audience, and denied a director or employee the right to represent the 
company, was compliant with Article 6.117 Similarly, orders by sheriffs that litigants find 
caution of £10,000118 and £3,000119 to proceed with their cases and the provisions of the 
Vexatious Actions (Scotland) Act 1898 have all been upheld as compliant with the right to a 
court derived from Article 6. 
 
The only instance of the Scottish Courts declaring a violation of Article 6(1) in relation to the 
right to a court arose in the case of S v Miller (No 2),120 due to the absence of legal aid to pay 
for the legal representation of a child in a children’s hearing. The issue of court fees affecting 
the right to a court does not appear to have been raised in the Scottish Courts. 
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Careful consideration of the five factors discussed above would be required to raise a successful 
legal challenge against court fees in Scotland, on the basis of an Article 6(1) violation. For the 
purposes of such a challenge, having been impeded from going to court by fees would clearly 
strengthen a litigant’s case. In this regard, evidence may be required to demonstrate that either 
the litigant did not have access to the necessary funds to pay his or her court fees. If this is not 
possible, a litigant could demonstrate that although such funds may have been notionally 
available, their use would have threatened other essential household expenditure or would have 
put the litigant at risk of falling below an acceptable standard of living.121 
 
Several features of the system of the administration of court fees in Scotland would assist a 
litigant. The fact that fees are imposed at the outset of litigation, and that they are unrelated to 
the merits of cases being taken, would count in a litigant’s favour. There might also be case-
specific factors that could assist an applicant’s case, such as the pursuit of a strong legal claim 
or the conduct of the judicial authorities, if relevant. 
 
If a litigant was able to successfully persuade a court that court fees had violated their right of 
access to a court, the question of appropriate remedies would then arise. Given the 
individualised nature of the assessment which is outlined in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on this 
subject, a successful legal challenge of this sort may not result in the revocation of FCR in its 
entirety. Any such claim, if successful, might only result in a declaration that a violation 
occurred for the particular litigant (albeit this would depend on how the case was argued and 
other variables). On the other hand, if a litigant was able to provide evidence that the effect of 
the fees system on the right to a court affected a significant proportion of the population of 
which (s)he was effectively representative, then this may persuade a court to disapply or declare 
that the implementing legislation is not law. 
 
(2) Challenging FCR at common law 
 
Our final point of discussion is whether an inaccessible feeing system could be challenged on 
a basis other than the ECHR, through an underlying commitment to access to justice. (For the 
purposes of this assessment we would assume that any such system was introduced after 
appropriate consultation and no procedural or administrative law challenge could be made.)122 
As has already been noted, the traditional starting point for notions of access to justice in 
Scotland is the 15th century Poor’s Roll, with analysis then working forward from there 
focussing on the ways in which indigent litigants have been offered support to conduct their 
cases through the years. This shows that Scots law has long afforded means by which people 
can find support while litigating, but would Scots law allow a challenge to be brought directly 
against a court fee contained in a legal instrument that was otherwise properly made? 
 
In the recent UNISON case the UK Supreme Court held that the Employment Tribunals and 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013123 was an unlawful exercise of the Lord 
Chancellor’s powers under section 42(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
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2007.124 This was the case because the prescribed fees interfered unjustifiably with the right of 
access to justice under (English) common law, and also EU law (to the extent that any rights 
curtailed by the fees were rights contained in EU law).  
 
Whilst it was a Scottish justice, Lord Reed, who provided the unanimous judgment in that case 
(augmented by a contribution by Lady Hale on discrimination),125 the access to justice lessons 
for Scots common law from this case can only be drawn with suitable caveats about the 
transferability of the judgment. 
 
Lord Reed led a lengthy discussion on the “constitutional right of access to the courts”,126 
where he explained the ways in which the English Courts have delineated this principle with 
reference to a number of significant cases.127 All of the features of this part of the judgement 
are indicative of its particular applicability to England. In particular, in his discussion on the 
legal authorities supportive of the existence of a right of access to the courts, Lord Reed made 
reference to exclusively English cases,128 quoted from the Magna Carta of 1215 (a 
constitutional text on which MacQueen recently commented, “the unrepealed chapters… are 
not, and never have been, part of the law of Scotland”)129 and discussed contributions by 
English legal writers (Edward Coke and William Blackstone).130 When these factors are 
combined with the fact that the discussion was preceded by the heading, “Is the Fees Order 
unlawful under English law?”,131 the likelihood is that its direct transferability to Scots law will 
be limited.  
 
On the other hand, UNISON will have some influence on the Scottish courts. The legislation 
which underpins the Supreme Court itself provides that, “A decision of the Supreme Court on 
appeal from a court of any part of the United Kingdom, other than a decision on a devolution 
matter, is to be regarded as the decision of a court of that part of the United Kingdom.”132 The 
question of what degree of precedent is to be accorded to such decisions of the UK Supreme 
Court (and its predecessor the House of Lords) in the Scottish Courts is a topic in itself, the 
answer to which is context-dependent.133 Given the above discussion, the decision could be 
expected to be persuasive on the Scottish Courts, but cannot automatically be treated as 
binding. It might further be expected that the Scottish courts will look to Scotland’s own 
historical legal texts and traditions in any determination of the existence of a common law right 
of access to justice;134 the route to a decision might be different and as yet untested, but the 
drive to reach a similar decision would be great. 
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That being said, useful analysis of the case has already taken place from a Scottish 
perspective.135 Further, the Scottish Government noticeably reacted to the most recent 
consultation on court fees in a manner that seemed concerned to portray its feeing arrangements 
as much less draconian than that which was struck down in UNISON.136 The Scottish 
Government also took into account relevant parts of that judgment, notably a passage where 
Lord Reed highlighted it was not only unaffordable fees that can prevent access to justice, but 
equally it could be fees that make it futile or irrational to litigate.137 All of this goes some way 
to show that a common law challenge is at least a consideration and could yet occur in the 
future, albeit (as noted below) a longer-term political strategy might be a more realistic 




In UNISON, Lord Reed noted the following of the fees that were ultimately successfully 
challenged: “In order for the fees to be lawful, they have to be set at a level that everyone can 
afford, taking into account the availability of full or partial remission.”138 
 
That statement was then highlighted by the Access to Justice Committee in the consultation 
response that served as an introduction to this article. The response acknowledged that Lord 
Reed was addressing a particular tribunal regime, but noted that it should be considered “a 
general statement of principle”.139 The response then concluded in the following terms: 
 
It has been a longstanding cliché that litigation is a privilege that can only be enjoyed 
by the very rich or the very poor. A policy of full cost recovery only exacerbates that 
problem. Fee exemptions for the poorest only address one aspect of affordability. For 
many the cost of litigation is already a significant burden. 
 
This article has developed the points made in that response, and introduced some further points 
that must be considered before any further roll out of FCR in the civil justice system is 
considered. 
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The policy of FCR is part of the inheritance of devolution, and it has been enthusiastically 
embraced by all Scottish Governments so far. The justifications used for retaining FCR are that 
the civil justice system is a private dispute resolution service – the majority of the benefits of 
which go to the litigants directly involved, and that access to justice is protected for those who 
cannot afford to pay court fees by a fee exemption system. 
 
This article has questioned these justifications. On a close reading, the evidence repeatedly 
cited by the Scottish Government in support of its stance that court fees have little effect on 
access to justice in fact suggests the exact opposite. It appears to show that increasing court 
fees would have a detrimental effect on a significant minority of people whose cases are already 
in court. Further, by surveying the views of those whose cases were in court, the study’s 
methodology is such that it is doubtful whether the study provides any useful findings in 
relation to the effect of court fees on those considering going to court. The Scottish 
Government’s position that the effects of fees are minimal rests upon shaky foundations. 
 
Similarly, while it is correct to say that individual litigants can gain excludable private benefits 
from going to court, the current Scottish Government’s view of the civil justice system ignores 
the other benefits that it provides. Access to civil justice ensures that civil rights can be enforced 
through the courts, helps the courts to clarify the law, resolves disputes peacefully, and is vital 
for democracy in policing the legality of acts of the Executive through judicial review. 
 
We have argued that it may be feasible to challenge FCR through the courts. However, making 
a legal challenge could be difficult for a potential litigant for financial reasons. By necessity, a 
litigant would not be legally aided because if they were below the civil legal aid threshold then 
they would qualify for the court fee exemption and would therefore not have any complaint 
about having their rights affected. Such a litigant would therefore either have to pay their own 
legal representation to pursue such a claim, require pro bono legal representation, or attempt 
the claim as a party litigant. Compounding this, any such challenge would proceed through 
judicial review, which is a costly procedure with high court fees. There would also be a risk of 
liability for the expenses of the other side if the claim failed. 
 
If the financial difficulties involved in bringing a claim can be overcome, litigation could be 
effective in provoking a reconsideration of FCR, either by forcing a re-write of the court fee 
rules following a successful challenge, or by stimulating parliamentary activity at Holyrood by 
drawing attention to the issue. As has been explained, the power to set court fees (or to not set 
court fees) is one which is exclusively enjoyed by the Scottish Ministers. For the underpinning 
logic of FCR to be properly challenged Scottish parliamentarians will be required to focus on 
an issue which, has thus far generated little debate in Holyrood. The entrenchment of FCR is 
such that a concerted political and legal effort will be required for the policy to be unseated. 
